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PUSHING THE LAW TO ENCOMPASS THE
REALITY OF OUR FAMILIES: PROTECTING
LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES FROM
EVICTION FROM THEIR HOMES -
BRASCHPS FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF
"FAMILY" AND BEYOND
Paris R. Baldacci*
I. Introduction
In the early days of gay liberation, many were weaned on the
milk of the "polymorphous perverse," i.e., the notion that the sex-
ual/erotic realities of one's life would effect a radical restructuring
of the personal, social, economic and political structures that con-
stitute the social order in which we live.1 Thus, it is a strange no-
tion, indeed, that "pushing the law to encompass the reality of our
families" might be at the center of a lesbian and gay legal agenda.
Stranger yet is the fact that this struggle initially worked itself out,
not in the "higher" ethers of federal or even state constitution-
based civil rights litigation, but in the "lower" realms of landlord-
tenant law.2 Nevertheless, such amazement not withstanding, les-
bian and gay self-definition as "family" and, therefore, the entitle-
ment of lesbian and gay families to family anti-eviction protection,
is the context in which one of the most significant legal victories for
lesbian and gay equality in New York State was achieved.3 Indeed,
it continues to be a forum in which lesbian and gay men not only
radically challenge the traditional heterosexual definition of "fam-
ily" based exclusively on blood and marriage, but also a forum in
which lesbians and gay men redefine and re-educate straight soci-
ety regarding the very values that constitute "family."
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Cardozo Bet
Tzedek Legal Services Clinic; J.D. 1987, City University of New York Law School;
Ph.D. 1974, Marquette University; B.A. 1965, University of Scranton. I want to ac-
knowledge Lisa Catalano, my research assistant, for her assistance in preparing this
paper, and Andrew Dolkart, my family, without whose encouragement this article
would not have been written.
1. HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
INTO FREUD 44-46 (1962); DENNIS ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LIBER-
ATION 77-80, 92-107 (1971).
2. See infra Section II.
3. Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
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Because of this significance, I propose in this essay to review the
origin and application of the functional definition of "family"
adopted in that struggle. Part II will discuss the definition of family
that was adopted in Braschi v. Stahl Associates and that has since
been codified in New York State's family anti-eviction regulations.4
Part III A will survey the inclusive and flexible way in which this
definition has been applied by the trial courts. Part III B will dis-
cuss two areas in which a rigid application of the Braschi functional
definition of family can actually work to exclude some lesbian and
gay families and to reassert a more traditional notion of family
based on hierarchy and prescribed formal and legal agreements.
This essay will conclude by considering some alternatives and pro-
posals for meeting these challenges and problems.
II. Braschi v. Stahl Associates
The landscape of family anti-eviction protection 5 in New York
State was significantly altered by the Court of Appeals' landmark
decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, which adopted a definition
of "family" that includes lesbian, gay and other families, which
have been traditionally denied social and legal recognition.6
4. Accordingly, my comments regarding the validity and utility of a functional
definition of "family" are limited by my focus on the development of a functional
definition within a particular legal context, i.e., New York State's family anti-eviction
laws. Thus, I will not address the applicability of such a functional definition in other
areas of law. However, I believe that a critical analysis of how a functional definition
of "family" has been applied in this area will provide insights into its possible use in
other legal contexts. Additionally, since the definitional development traced here oc-
curred in a series of cases and enactments whose focus was on a statutory interpreta-
tion of the term "family," I will not address the constitutional issues which are also at
the core of lesbian and gay attempts to "push the law to encompass the reality of our
families."
5. Although the term "succession rights" is frequently used to describe the rights
won in Braschi, it should be noted that the more appropriate rubric is "family anti-
eviction protection." The right litigated and determined in Braschi was Miguel Bras-
chi's right to be protected from eviction under New York City Rent and Eviction
Regulations, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(1962). The Braschi court held, "the manifest
intent of this section is to restrict the landowner's ability to evict a narrow class of
occupants other than the tenant of record." 543 N.E.2d at 52 (emphasis added). Simi-
larly, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of amended regulations codifying the
Braschi definition of "family" precisely because these regulations were a reasonable
and equitable means of protecting families from the trauma of dislocation from their
homes. Rent Stabilization Association v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 634 (N.Y. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2693, (1994).
6. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 377-474
(1993); Barbara Cox, Love Makes a Family - Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the
Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonlegal Parents in Alternative Families, 8
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 5 (1991).
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Within four months of the Braschi decision, the New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("D.H.C.R.")
promulgated regulations, which codify and amplify the Braschi def-
inition of "family" and which apply to over one million rent-regu-
lated apartments in NewYork State.7
A. The Decision and Its Antecedents8
The issue before the Court of Appeals in Braschi was whether
Miguel Braschi, the surviving gay life partner of Leslie Blanchard,
a rent-controlled tenant who had died of AIDS, was entitled to
seek protection from eviction under the New York City Rent and
7. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2104.6 (1990) (State Rent and Eviction Regulations [rent-con-
trolled apartments outside New York City]); § 2204.6 (1990) (New York City Rent
and Eviction Regulations [rent controlled-apartments in New York City]); § 2500.2
and § 2503.5 (1990) (Emergency Tenant Protection Regulations [rent-stabilized apart-
ments outside New York City]); § 2520.6 & § 2523.5 (1990) (Rent Stabilization Code
[rent-stabilized apartments in New York City]). For simplicity of reference, future
citations to the regulations will only cite New York City Rent and Eviction Regula-
tions and the Rent Stabilization Code ("R.S.C."). In their wake, similar regulations
have been promulgated by D.H.C.R. governing state-regulated Mitchell-Lama coop-
eratives and apartments, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1727-8, and by the New York City Depart-
ment of Housing Preservation and Development ("H.P.D.") covering New York City-
regulated Mitchell-Lama tenancies, Title 28 RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Ch.
3, § 3-02(p), and in rem centrally managed properties and properties managed by the
City's Division of Homeless Housing Development. Title 28 RULES OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, Ch. 24, § 24-01. In addition, the New York City Human Rights Commis-
sion, adopting the Braschi definition of "family," has found that denying surviving life
partners the same anti-eviction or succession rights afforded married couples violates
New York City's prohibition against discrimination based on marital-status. ADM.
CODE OF THE CITY OF N.Y. § 8-107(5); see Velasquez v. Salinas Realty Corp, Com-
plaint No. GA00299061190-H (April 8, 1992) (refusal to transfer rent-stabilized
lease); see also Kirkpatrick v. 60 Sutton Corp., N.Y.L.J., October 22, 1991, p. 24 col. 4
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (preliminary injunction permitting life-partner to occupy co-
operative apartment pending the Human Rights Commission's determination); cf.
Chatham Towers v. Tom, N.Y.L.J., January 5, 1994, p. 22 col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County)
(unmarried heterosexual life-partner succeeds to cooperative shares as "spouse").
8. Many commentators have written about the Braschi decision. See Scott
Turner, Braschi v. Stahl Associates: In Praise of Family, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1295
(1991); William B. Rubenstein, We are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal
Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J. OF L. AND POL. 89 (1991); Note,
Braschi v. Stahl: Family Redefined, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 289 (1990); Note,
Braschi v. Stahl Associates: Much Ado About Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361 (1990);
Note, Family Law - Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Expansion of the Term 'Family'
to Include Nontraditional Relationships, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 135 (1989); Note,
Family Ties: A Comparison of the Changing Legal Definition of Family in Succession
Rights to Rent-Regulated Housing in the United States and Great Britain, 17 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 123 (1991); Note, Redefining the Family, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183
(1990); Note, The Broadening of Succession Rights: Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 3
HOFSTRA PROP. L. J. 33 (1989).
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Eviction Regulations.9 That regulation provided that a landlord
could not evict "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant
or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has
been living with the tenant."'" Reversing the Appellate Division,
First Department, which had held that "family," as used in the reg-
ulation, included only "family members within traditional, legally
recognized family relationships,"" the Court of Appeals held that
the term family, as used in 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 2204.6(d), should not
be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their
relationship . . . The intended protection against sudden evic-
tion should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic his-
tory, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of
family life.1 2
The court found that "the totality of the relationship as evi-
denced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties...
should, in the final analysis, control. ' 13 Thus, in Braschi, the Court
of Appeals adopted a holistic and functional approach to describe
the "reality of family life." The terms "dedication, caring and self-
sacrifice" may be strangely ephemeral sounding words on which to
litigate a claim to family anti-eviction protection in Housing Court.
However, the Braschi Court looked to a history of trial court deci-
sions which indicated that this standard was decipherable and
workable. 4 A brief look at two lines of these decisions may be
helpful in understanding what the Braschi court intended by its
adoption of this functional definition.' 5
In Gelman v. Castaneda,'6 a surviving gay life partner claimed
that he was part of his deceased lover's "family" and, thus, should
not be evicted from the rent-controlled apartment they had shared.
The housing court not only agreed that the respondent was "fam-
ily," but indeed that he was "immediate family." This court was
guided by a functional understanding of the term "family" in
reaching its decision: "[T]he close nature of the relationship ...
[and] the fact that renewal rights are extended to [traditionally-
9. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(1962).
10. Id.
11. 531 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (N.Y. App Div. 1988)
12. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53.
13. Id. at 55.
14. Id.
15. See also supra note 8. However, my focus in briefly revisiting this same land-
scape is to identify the core terms/values/functions by which "family" was described
or defined in those cases.
16. N.Y.L.J., October 22, 1986, p. 13 col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
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recognized] family members with far more distant relationships,
emotionally and economically.' 17
The Castaneda Court's description of "family" as an emotionally
and economically "close relationship" relied on the definition of
"family" used earlier in Two Associates v. Brown,'8 in which that
court found that two gay life partners were a family since they had
lived in a "loving relationship" evidenced by economic interdepen-
dence. 19 Indeed, the Brown Court also noted that "a host of rela-
tives who ... are deemed to be family members" often have no
such emotional or economic relationship with the tenant or among
each other.20 The Brown Court reached its conclusion that such an
arrangement constituted a "family" by adopting the definition of
"family" used in In re Adult Anonymous II: ". . . the best descrip-
tion of a family is a continuing relationship of love and care, and an
assumption of responsibility for some other person."'" Accord-
ingly, the Brown Court found that to exclude the type of close,
loving, interdependent relationship evidenced by the two men in
that case from a definition of "family," while including the "host of
relatives" in the then current scheme, "would indeed be an arbi-
trary way to define family." 22
Thus, for the trial judges deciding this line of cases, which dealt
with the anti-eviction rights of gay life partners and which
presented uncontested facts regarding the close emotional and eco-
nomic relationships of the couples,23 the key issue was simply, "Are
they a family?". Using a functional definition focusing on the fac-
tors of love, care and commitment, both emotional and economic,
these courts consistently found that the relationships before them
17. Id.
18. 502 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 513
N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
19. Id. at 607.
20. Id. D.H.C.R.'s December 10, 1985, EMERGENCY OPERATIONAL BULLETIN,
No. 85-1, defined "family" to include husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, step-
daughter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle,
aunt, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-
law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law. This list was codified in the pre-Braschi Rent Stabi-
lization Code. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2520.6(o)(1987).
21. 502 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (quoting In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198,201
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
22. Id.
23. Prior to the Braschi decision and the regulations codifying that decision, land-
lords challenged the legal entitlement of gay couples to family anti-eviction protection
under any circumstances, not the facts of their cases. As will be discussed more fully
below, now that the legitimacy of the legal claim has been settled, the focus in litiga-
tion is generally on the factual support for such a claim.
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were families. Indeed, they even articulated discomfort with being
asked to make distinctions between loving, caring and committed
straight families, and loving, caring and committed gay families.
"[W]e do not think it productive to spend judicial time conjuring
up artificial distinctions among various sexual, fraternal, and eco-
nomic relationships. ' 24 This emphasis on these core functions by
which to define "family" would be echoed in the Braschi decision.
A second line of cases relied on by the Braschi Court utilized a
more fully articulated social science-based functional definition of
family. In 2-4 Realty Associates v. Pittman,25 Jimmie Hendrix, a 48
year old black man, claimed that he had lived with Henry Pittman
for over twenty-five years as son and father. Mr. Hendrix and his
mother had moved into Mr. Pittman's rent-controlled apartment at
first as boarders, but gradually "[t]he relationship developed into
one of devoted concern, sharing, trust, loyalty, and love .... Jim-
mie found the father he had never had."' 26 The importance of this
case, in addition to the fact that it saved Mr. Hendrix's home for
him, is that it set out a sociologically-based functional definition of
"family," which the Braschi Court would borrow whole cloth.
The Pittman Court cited at length the testimony of respondent's
expert witness, a sociologist, regarding the "criteria" used by soci-
ologists "in determining whether a true family unit exists. 2z7 These
criteria were:
1) the longevity of the relationship; 2) the level of commitment
and support among its members.., both material[ly] and emo-
tional[ly]; 3) the sense in which the individuals define them-
selves as a family unit. . ., and also the way that neighbors and
other institutions define them as a family unit; 4) the way in
which members of the unit came to rely on each other to pro-
vide daily family services; 5) the shared history of the group...
and 6) the high degree of religious and moral commitment.28
24. 420 East 80th Co. v. Chin, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42, 44 (N.Y. App. Term 1982), aff'd,
468 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (cohabiting gay males do not violate lease pro-
vision limiting co-occupants to "immediate family").
25. 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1987), aff'd, 547 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.
App. Term 1989).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. See also Zimmerman v. Burton, 404 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980) (agreement to enter into an exclusive and permanent relationship "con-
summated" by cohabitation for a significant period, citing sociologist David Reis-
man); Athineos v. Thayer, N.Y.L.J., March 15, 1987, p. 12 col. 4 (Civ. Ct. Kings
County)(level of commitment and support exemplified by self-definition as family,
citing Pittman) aff'd, 545 N.Y.S. 2d 337(N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
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In sum, the court adopted the sociologist's finding that a "family"
existed where there was evidence of "dedication, caring and self-
sacrifice." 9
Thus, we are brought back full circle to the Braschi Court's em-
phasis on a holistic, functional definition of "family," i.e., on "the
totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring
and self-sacrifice of the parties."3 The Braschi Court also incorpo-
rated whole cloth the Pittman "criteria":
29. 523 N.Y.S.2d at 9. The court also noted the expert's testimony regarding the
prevalence of such functional family configurations among American Blacks, particu-
larly as developed and carried North during the migration of Southern Blacks to ur-
ban areas in the North. Id.; cf. NICHOLAS LEHMAN, THE PROMISED LAND. THE
GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991). Finally, the
court noted the use of a more functional, alternative, inclusive definition of "family"
by the courts in a series of zoning cases. 523 N.Y.S.2d at 10-13.
30. 543 N.E.2d at 55. Many commentators agree that these core values/functions
are essential aspects of any functional definition of family. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two
Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Pro-
tection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 564-68 (1992) (love and
intimacy); Steven H. Hobbs, In Search of Family Value: Constructing a Framework
For Jurisprudential Discourse, 75 MARO. L. REV. 529, 534-36 (1992) (groups of per-
sons who socialize its members and provide the necessaries of life and emotional se-
curity); Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving, and
Owning, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 287-88 (1992/93) (persons who share resources, re-
sponsibility for decisions, values and goals, and have a commitment to each other over
time); Note, "A Family Like Any Other Family": Alternative Methods of Defining
Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1048-49 (1990/1991) (same,
but emphasizing role of self-definition in determining both levels of such values/func-
tions in individual relationships and the variety of forms in which such values are
actualized). See also Kath Weston, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP
103-136 (1991) (documenting that lesbians and gay men articulate similar values/func-
tions as described above as central to their own self-defined family configurations);
Jan Meyer, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner This Time? A Study of Gay Intimate
Relationships and the Support for Those Relationships, HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY
RELATIONS 59 (1990) (same); for a more social-historical analysis of the complex pat-
terns of self- and relational identification used by gay men, including the use of kin-
ship terminology, see GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK. GENDER, URBAN
CULTURES AND THE MEANING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 33-127, 290-291 (1994).
However, some commentators maintain that this standard is inherently discriminatory
since it is based on an idealized notion of "family", rarely, if ever, achieved by legally
recognized families. See Jody Freeman, Defining the Family in Mossop v. DSS: The
Challenge of Anti-essentialism and Interactive Discrimination for Human Rights 44 U.
TORONTO L.J. 41 (Winter 1994); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits
of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1653 (1991); Note, Redefining the Family, supra note 8, at 195-96. In addition,
some would argue that this standard is patriarchal and premised upon a hierarchical
power arrangement. Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians
in Legal Theory, 19 SIGNS 972 (Summer 1994) (and authors cited there); for a critique
of this position as reductionist and potentially racist, see Didi Herman, Are We Fam-
ily?: Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 789, 799-804
(1990). Although the Braschi standard might be applied in such an idealized and
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In [making an objective assessment of the relationship], the
lower courts of this State have looked to a number of factors,
including the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the
level of emotional commitment, the manner in which the parties
have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to
society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily fam-
ily services.31
However, the Braschi Court specifically admonished that this func-
tional definition should not be applied mechanistically, using the
listed factors like a score card or tally sheet. "These factors are
most helpful, although it should be emphasized that the presence
or absence of one or more of them is not dispositive since it is the
totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring
and self-sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final analysis,
control."32
B. Regulatory Codification
On November 1, 1989, within four months of the Braschi deci-
sion, D.H.C.R. promulgated emergency regulations and noticed
proposed permanent amendments to all rent control and rent stabi-
lization regulations.33 These regulations codify the Braschi func-
tional definition of family,34 set forth suggested evidentiary
categories by which a person can make out a claim under the regu-
lations, and establish a minimum cohabitation requirement.35 As
patriarchal manner (see more fully below Part III B), such an application is not inevi-
table. See more fully below Part III A.
31. 543 N.E.2d at 54 (citing 2-4 Realty Associates v. Pittman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1987)).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. See supra note 7. Not surprisingly, these regulations were immediately at-
tacked by various landlord associations. However, the Court of Appeals unanimously
rejected all of their claims. Rent Stabilization Association v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626
(N.Y. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2693 (1994). I was privileged to argue that case on
behalf of numerous lesbian, gay, disabled, tenant, and poor defendant-intervenors.
At oral argument on November 16, 1993, the court's primary inquiry of the plaintiffs
was regarding how the challenged regulations were different from, what Chief Judge
Kaye called, the "essence" or the "spirit" of Braschi. Of course, plaintiffs were unable
to persuasively argue such a position.
34. Under the previous rent control regulations, "family" was not defined. 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(1962). In the R.S.C., "family" was limited to a specified list
of family members related by blood, marriage or adoption; see supra note 20.
35. The amended regulations require that the family member have co-resided with
the tenant for two years, one year if the family member is disabled or elderly (9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6[d][1](1990), § 2523.5[b][1](1990); for definition of "disabled," see
§ 2204.6[d][3][iii](1990), § 2523.5[b][4](1990); for definition of elderly [62 or older],
see § 2204.6[d][3][ii)(1990), § 2520.6[p](1990)), or from the inception of the tenancy or
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such, they represent a logical codification and development of the
Braschi standard.
Most importantly, they retain the central holistic, functional ap-
proach adopted in Braschi. The regulations set forth the same core
standard: "emotional and financial commitment, and interdepen-
dence."36 The "criteria" set forth in Pittman and the "factors" set
forth in Braschi that should guide an objective examination37 of the
relationship are replicated in the regulations, expanded by sug-
gested evidentiary categories. 38 The regulations also echo the ad-
monition in Braschi that "no single factor shall be solely
the commencement of the relationship if such periods are less than the two/one year
standard (9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6[d][1](1990); § 2523.5[b][1])(1990).). In addition, the
same co-residency requirement now applies whether the tenant of record dies or vol-
untarily vacates the apartment. Pursuant to the terms of the prior R.S.C., on the
death of the tenant, the co-residency requirement was two years, one year if elderly or
disabled, or from the inception of the tenancy or the commencement of the relation-
ship if less (§ 2523.5[b][2](1987)); however, on the voluntary departure of the tenant,
the remaining family member had to have co-resided in the apartment with the tenant
from the inception of the tenancy or the commencement of the relationship
(§ 2523.5[b][1](1987)). The prior rent control regulations simply required that the
family member have "liv[ed] with" the tenant of record. 9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 2204.6(d)(1962). That requirement did not impose any specific longevity require-
ment, but merely required that the "[I]iving arrangement, whatever its duration,
bear[ I some indicia of permanence or continuity." 829 Seventh Ave. Co v. Reider,
502 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (1986), rev'g on other grounds 491 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985). Courts had found that this requirement could be met where there was a
co-residency of one year (Herzog v. Joy, 428 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), aff'd,
439 N.Y.S.2d 922 [1981] or as brief as only five months (829 Seventh Ave.) or even five
weeks (Coleman v. Sillman, N.Y.L.J., March 6, 1991, p. 22 col. 6 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County)).
36. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(1990), § 2520.6(o)(2)(1990).
37. Some commentators have criticized the Braschi standards as being "subjec-
tive" and, thus, open to manipulation, misinterpretation or misapplication. See, e.g.,
Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
269, 276-84 (1991). This was the same attack mounted by plaintiff-landlords in Rent
Stabilization Association v. Higgins against the post-Braschi regulations. However,
this claim was resoundingly rejected by the Appellate Division, 562 N.Y.S. 2d 962, 972
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990), and by the Court of Appeals, 630 N.E.2d at 632. Indeed, I
submit that the history of the application of these standards in the trial courts, see
below Part III A, demonstrates that the factors set forth in the regulations provide
objective, but not mechanistically rigid standards by which to determine the existence
of a family relationship.
38. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(a) - (h)(1990); § 2520.6(o)(2)(i) - (viii)(1990):
(i) longevity of the relationship;
(ii) sharing of or relying upon each other for payment of household or fam-
ily expenses, and/or other common necessities of life;
(iii) intermingling of finances as evidenced by, among other things, joint
ownership of bank accounts, personal and real property, credit cards, loan
obligations, sharing a household budget for purposes of receiving govern-
ment benefits, etc.;
(iv) engaging in family-type activities.. .
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determinative."3 9 However, as will be discussed more fully below
in Part III B, this admonition is not always followed by courts look-
ing for an easy checklist approach in determining the existence of a
family relationship using the functional definition established in
Braschi and codified in the amended regulations.
III. Application of the Functional Definition of "Family" in the
Trial Courts.
A survey of the approximately twenty-five reported cases apply-
ing the Braschi definition of "family" demonstrates that the trial
courts have generally been receptive to the challenge of exploring
the multiple forms lesbian and gay families take,40 applying the
codified "factors" in a non-mechanistic way. However, the re-
ported cases also show that some courts have been resistant to that
task, rushing to force lesbian and gay relationships into precon-
ceived "Ozzie and Harriet" notions of the ideal patriarchal family,
or giving determinative weight to the absence of particular catego-
ries of evidence suggested in the regulations. 41 First, I will briefly
survey those cases in which the courts have been receptive to the
challenge presented by the functional definition. After that analy-
(v) formalizing of legal obligations, intentions, and responsibilities to each
other by such means as executing wills naming each other as executor and/or
beneficiary, conferring upon each other a power of attorney and/or other
authority to make health care decisions for each other, entering into a per-
sonal relationship contract, making a domestic partnership declaration, or
serving as a representative payee for purposes of public benefits, etc.;
(vi) holding themselves out as family members to other family members,
friends, members of the community or religious institutions, or society in
general, through their words or actions;
(vii) regularly performing family functions, such as caring for each other or
each other's extended family members, and/or relying upon each other for
daily family services;
(viii) engaging in any other pattern of behavior, agreement or other action
that evidences the intention of creating a long-term, emotionally committed
relationship.
However, "[i]n no event would evidence of a sexual relationship between such per-
sons be required or considered." 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(1990);
§ 2520.6(o)(2)(1990). Nevertheless, the Appellate Term, First Department, affirmed a
finding of family relationship in part on the fact that the couple had a child while co-
residing. Lepar Realty v. Griffin, 581 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Term 1991).
39. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(1990), § 2520.6(o)(2)(1990).
40. See Weston, supra note 30.
41. I do not presume that every case in which a court has found that a family
relationship did not exist is an example of this latter failure. There are, indeed, both
borderline cases and cases in which there is simply no evidence of the claimed
relationship.
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sis, I will address the problems raised by some courts' unwillingness
to accept this challenge.
A. Successful Applications of Braschi
There are at least five reported post-Braschi cases in which les-
bian and gay families were recognized by the courts. In O'Malley
v. Silva,42 the court rejected the claim that a surviving lesbian life
partner was a "friend," not a family member. The court found that
"[a]rrayed against petitioner's testimony, was substantial credible
testimony that Ms. Silva and Ms. Ammirati had an exclusive, inti-
mate, loving family relationship from 1975 to the date of Ms. Am-
mirati's death in 1991.... The court was willing to consider not
only such formal evidence of financial interdependence as the
couple's joint bank account, the surviving partner's designation as
beneficiary in a small insurance policy and the decedent's will, but
also the fact that "they spent holidays together; that they attended
family parties, picnics, celebrations, visits with each other's rela-
tives and children; and that ultimately they shared illness and
tragedy.""
The court also gave significant weight to testimony from wit-
nesses, including the decedent's cousin, regarding the closeness of
the relationship. The court particularly noted that "In highly
charged and emotional testimony, Ms. Silva movingly related how
Ms. Ammirati died in her arms."' 45 Although the court would
likely have reached the same decision without the more formal evi-
dence, it is significant that the functional definition of "family"
codified in the regulations provided not only a framework within
which Ms. Silva could present the personal and emotional reality of
her family relationship to the court, but also a framework within
which the court could objectively evaluate that claim,
Similarly, in Strassman v. Estate of Daniel Eggena,46 the court
gave particular weight to evidence that the gay male couple "trav-
eled together and with friends extensively. They visited each
others' family together and slept together while on such visits. To
family and friends, they were a 'family.' "47 The court also noted
42. N.Y.L.J., December 15, 1993, p. 25 col. 3 (Civ. Ct. Queens County).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1990, p. 23 col. 4 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd 582 N.Y.S.2d
899 (N.Y. App. Term 1992).
47. Id. Once again, as in Lepar Realty v. Griffin, 581 N.Y.S.2d.521 (N.Y. App.
Term 1991), the prohibition against considering "a sexual relationship" between the
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that it was the surviving partner who had cared for Mr. Eggena in
his last days.48 The court was even open to understanding that the
standard of "financial interdependence" set forth in Braschi and
the regulations must not be applied formulaically. Thus, the court
did not discount the overwhelming evidence of the couple's rela-
tionship simply because the couple did not have a joint bank ac-
count when Mr. Eggena died or because of the fact that the
decedent paid for most of the couple's expenses and gave his life
partner "expensive gifts." 49
In East 10th Street Associates v. Goldstein,50 the Appellate Divi-
sion, without remand to the trial court, found that the gay male life
partners in that case were a "family" under the Braschi test. Once
again, the most significant aspect of the court's decision in this case
is the manner in which it described the facts of the couple's rela-
tionship. It did not attempt to objectify the relationship by primary
reference to formal, "objective" evidence of, for example, financial
intermingling; rather, it primarily focused on the core values/func-
tions at the heart of the Braschi test:
Both these individuals demonstrated a high level of emotional
commitment to one another and took care of each other's day-
to-day needs. They were open about their relationship, and
their devotion to one another as life partners was apparent to
their family and friends, as is reflected in affidavits by Gold-
stein's [the decedent] mother and son, who considered Wells
[the surviving partner] to be a part of the family and have char-
acterized the relationship of their son and father as that of
spouse to Wells.51
One may shudder at the "spousal" analogy from an ideological
perspective - lesbian and gay relationships should not be seen as
derivative of heterosexual models - but note that the conceptual-
ization was that of the couple's family members. To that extent,
parties need not totally exclude facts evidencing the intimate realities of the lives of
lesbians and gay men. Indeed, in the context of being out to one's biological family,
the fact that a couple "sleeps together" while visiting them is viewed by many as a
significant moment in lesbian and gay self definition as "family" or "couple." On the
complexities of coming out to one's biological family, see Weston, supra note 30, at
43-6.
48. See supra note 46.
49. Id.
50. 552 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). The Appellate Division used the
opportunity provided by this case to extend the Braschi definition to rent-stabilized
tenancies prior to the effective date of the amended rent stabilization regulations.
51. Id.
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the court was accurately reflecting the self-definition of the parties
involved.
Finally, in Lerad Realty Co. v. Reynolds,52 the court gave signifi-
cant weight to the fact the this gay male couple exchanged rings,
shared the same bed in a small studio apartment, shared household
expenses and chores, vacationed together regularly, and held them-
selves out as "family" to friends and business associates. 53 The sur-
viving partner cared lovingly for his partner during the final days
before his death from AIDS. Given significant documentary and
testimonial evidence regarding these factors, the court was not
swayed by the fact the couple did not have joint bank accounts or
were not named as beneficiaries on each other's life insurance poli-
cies, and the fact that the decedent would give the surviving part-
ner receipts for his share of the rent.54 Thus, the court was open to
the manner in which this couple had decided to arrange its finan-
cial affairs and did not rely on that one factor to negate the reality
of their self-definition as family.
Nor was the Reynolds Court swayed by the fact that this couple
had not held themselves out as family to their respective biological
families. As noted in the three previous cases discussed above,
those courts were particularly impressed by the incorporation of
the gay family into their respective biological families. In Reyn-
olds, focusing on the weight of the evidence described above and
the fact that the couple's biological families were not close to them
or accepting of their gayness, the court found that:
[t]o require that the court find a gay couple to have held them-
selves out openly and notoriously to their families, who might
not approve of the same [and with whom the couple had mini-
mal contact], in order to meet the Braschi test would be an un-
52. N.Y.L.J., August 29, 1990, p. 22 col. 5 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
53. Id.
54. Id. See also Colon v. Frias, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1994, p. 31 col. 4 (Civ. Ct. Kings
County), in which the court found that two women had lived in a close, committed
non-sexual relationship as "sisters" for thirty-four years, even though there was no
formal documentary evidence of financial interdependence. In rejecting the land-
lord's claim that the requirement of documented financial interdependence had not
been met since the decedent had not even taken out life insurance naming the re-
maining "sister" as beneficiary, the court found that:
Aside from the specific admonition of the Regulations that no one factor
should be determinative, the court is mindful of the fact that the Respondent
and [the decedent] were elderly women of limited means and did not employ
any of what might be considered modern financial methods; they had no
checking accounts or credit cards and they did not "invest" in anything, in-
cluding life insurance. [The decedent] did what she knew; she listed Respon-
dent as the Totten beneficiary on passbook savings account.
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realistic and unfair burden upon the surviving family member.
To put it another way, the absence of this factor, especially when
credibly explained away such as is the case here, does not and
should not defeat the existence of a committed relationship
which rises to the level of family. This is especially true when as
herein, the couple do in fact openly hold themselves out to soci-
ety in general as a family."
In evaluating these facts, as well as others that might have argued
against the couple's claim to be a family, the Reynolds Court ad-
hered to the Braschi Court's admonition to view the relationship in
its totality: "[O]ne must look to the totality of the facts and cir-
cumstances in determining whether these men were mere room-
mates" rather than family. 6
Similarly, in Picon v. O.D.C. Assocs., 7 the court looked to the
totality of that gay couple's relationship in order to evaluate the
significance of the surviving partner's having had an affair. "The
fact that [the remaining occupant] may have had an affair with an-
other man during [the deceased tenant's] illness ... does not neces-
sarily mean that [he] lived with that other man at a different
location. Nor does it mean that [the remaining occupant and the
tenant] were not gay life partners,... since peccadillos of this na-
ture seem not to be uncommon, even in the marital life of normally
[sic] married couples." 8
Thus, in reviewing the claims of lesbian and gay families, the
courts have been willing to consider the various forms in which a
committed, caring relationship can be effected.5 9 Before proceed-
55. N.Y.L.J., August 29, 1990, p. 22 col. 5.
56. Id.
57. Judgment No. 86-22894, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. January 28, 1991).
58. Id. Indeed, courts have held that the fact that one of the parties is legally
married cannot, in itself, defeat a claim under Braschi or the regulations. "While the
fact of the decedent's marriage may be a factor to consider, it is the totality of the
relationship with the [tenant] ...that is dispositive." Estate of Smith v. Atwood,
N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1990, p. 22 col. 1 (N.Y. App. Term) (emphasis added); see also
Lepar Realty Corp., 581 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (same).
59. The courts have evidenced a similar openness to alternative straight families.
Colon v. Frias, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1994, p. 31 col. 4 (Civ. Ct. Kings County) (two women
lived as "sisters"); RSP Realty Assoc. v. Paege, N.Y.L.J., August 14, 1992, p. 21 col. 4
(N.Y. App. Term) (second cousins lived as family: shared financial accounts, commit-
ment to cousin's children, designated as beneficiary on will); 43-45 W. 129 Street
HDFC v. Doe, N.Y.L.J., March 2, 1992, p. 31 col. 2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County) ("mother/
daughter": tenant was godmother to claimant; raised her from childhood for sixteen
years because biological mother was unable; provided for all emotional and financial
needs with minimal assistance from biological father; provided food, clothing, shelter
and education; disciplined her as a parent; common vacations and holidays; attended
church together; claimant cared for tenant during cancer-related illness); Lepar Realty
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ing to discuss examples where courts have attempted to force gay
family relationships into preconceived notions of the ideal patriar-
chal family or have inappropriately given determinative weight to
the absence of particular categories of evidence, two additional ob-
servations should be made. First, all of the cases discussed above
involved the death of one of the life partners, frequently from
AIDS. One might ask if these cases would have resulted in the
same determination if the relationship had simply ended. This is,
of course, difficult to judge. Two of the reported cases adjudicating
the claims of straight families under the Braschi standard involved
just such a scenario.6 ° In those cases, the courts found that a family
had existed prior to the tenant's vacatur. However, as will be dis-
cussed in the next part, contrary results in other such cases raise
serious issues regarding the difficulty some courts have in acknowl-
edging less than "ideal" families, especially after the relationship
has ended.
Second, it should also be noted that all of the lesbian and gay
family cases involved life partners. The cases involving straight
families have successfully litigated the claims of a greater variety of
family configurations, e.g., close second cousins, "sisters," "mother/
daughter," and "mother/son."' 61 Certainly the manner in which les-
bians and gay men live as families are more varied than the one
model litigated in the reported cases. 62 The willingness of the
courts to take such claims seriously is evidenced by the cases dis-
cussed above.
Corp., supra note 38 (heterosexual couple: six years co-residency, shared expenses,
held selves out as family, had child during co-residency and lived as family unit); Bat-
sikas v. Ligouri, 567 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1991) ("mother/son":
nephew and mother of paternal aunt; raised as "son" by aunt and uncle, called aunt's
mother "grandmother" and lived with "grandmother" as family unit for 11 years);
Estate of Causse, N.Y.L.J., November 28, 1990, p. 23 col. 2 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County)
("mother-daughter": uncontested documentary evidence establishing financial and
emotional relationship); Seminole Housing Corp. v. Leone, N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1990, p.
27 col. 3 (N.Y. App. Term) (heterosexual life partners: stipulated facts evidenced
family relationship); 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1987), aff'd, 547 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. App. Term 1989) ("father/son"
relationship).
60. Lepar Realty Corp. supra note 38 (heterosexual couple); RSP Realty Assoc.,
supra note 60 (second cousins who lived as family).
61. See supra note 59.
62. See Weston, supra note 30; Fajer, supra note 30.
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B. Braschi's Limitations: Some Problems in Applying a
Functional Definition of Family
Although I am convinced that New York State's adopting a func-
tional definition of family for anti-eviction purposes is a significant
advance for lesbian and gay equality, it is also evident that a rigid,
mechanistic and patriarchal application of this definition can result
in some families being excluded from recognition and protection.
This problem has been emerging in two ways:63 first, by judging
lesbian and gay families in relationship to an idealized image of
family life characterized by a "rosy picture of long-term, exclusive
devotion and emotional commitment; '64 second, by placing dispos-
itive weight on the absence of particular categories of evidence,
especially formal evidence of financial intermingling.
"Well, what family doesn't have its ups and downs? ' 65 In some
instances, courts have been unable to accept this less than "ideal"
reality of family life. In Park Holding Co. v. Power,66 the court
gave determinative weight to the gay claimant's admission that the
relationship was "definitely in trouble" a couple of years before his
partner moved out of the apartment. The court also found particu-
larly "relevant" the fact that they did not in those last years jointly
own property or formalize legal obligations.67 Whatever the actual
merits of this case, it demonstrates the two problems described
above: equating "trouble" with the end of the family relationship
and making a particular mode of financial interdependence (joint
account, formal legal obligations) determinative.68
63. There is only one reported lesbian or gay family case in which these problems
have surfaced. Park Holding Co. v. Power, N.Y.L.J., January 17, 1992, p. 26, col. 1
(N.Y. App. Term). However, these problems have also emerged in cases involving
straight families, which will be discussed in this Part.
64. Note, Redefining the Family, supra note 8, at 195.
65. The Lion in Winter (Embassy Pictures 1963).
66. N.Y.L.J., January 17, 1992, p. 26 col. 1 (N.Y. App. Term), appeal after trial on
remand from 554 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), see supra note 50.
67. Id. Additionally, there was the untoward spectacle of the former lover testify-
ing that their relationship had ended nine years earlier.
68. This emphasis on formal financial arrangements as dispositive in demonstrat-
ing financial interdependence will make it difficult for poor families to sustain their
claims, since they frequently do not have access to or need for such mechanisms.
Thus, their family status may be negated even though such families would be able to
demonstrate other arrangements evidencing financial interdependence. But see, Co-
lon, supra note 59 (family relationship found even though there was no formal docu-
mentary evidence of financial interdependence); see supra note 54. Indeed, even
middle-class families, both functional and traditionally-recognized, may arrange their
financial affairs in other than the formal ways favored by some courts. Nevertheless,
it is not an unreasonable application of Braschi or the regulations for a court to re-
quire evidence of financial interdependence appropriate to the economic status of the
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Similarly, in GSL Enterprises v. Goldstein,69 although the court
found that this straight couple had been involved in an intimate
relationship and that they had shared household expenses for two
and a half years, the fact that the relationship had "soured" and
that the couple did not have joint bank accounts or credit cards was
determinative in the court's rejection of the remaining party's
claim.70  In Eberhart v. Randall,71 it was uncontested that this
straight couple had lived together for ten years, slept in the same
bed, shared household expenses and chores, held themselves out as
a loving couple, and attended family functions as a couple. Never-
theless, the court, relying on GSL Enterprises, found:
[Tiheir relationship did not rise to an in-depth commitment be-
tween them. There is no evidence of such critical considerations
as joint bank accounts, joint credit cards, joint property owner-
ship . . . no indicia [such] as formalization of legal obligations
such as by naming each other as executor (executrix) or benefi-
ciary of a will of the other of them ... and there was no domes-
tic partnership declaration.72
parties. See, e.g., Walber 72nd Street Associates v. Padro, N.Y.L.J., August 23, 1994,
p.22 col. 3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County) (court rejected family claim where surviving straight
partner was completely unaware that decedent had $150,000 and was not named ben-
eficiary in her will: "The existence of separate bank accounts alone would not serve
to defeat the claim of a family relationship, but the complete separation of financial
resources [except for the sharing of routine household expenses] apparent herein is
particularly damaging to [respondent's] claim." (emphasis added)). However, see
Robson, supra note 30, at 985-988, for a compelling warning regarding the reduction-
ist, objectifying and instrumentalist implication of an economic-based definition of
human relationships.
69. N.Y.L.J., July 13, 1993, p. 22 col. 2 (N.Y. App. Term).
70. Id. Additionally, as in Park Holding, supra note 66, the claimant's post-
breakup words were used to negate the couple's prior self-definition as family. The
GSL Enterprises court particularly noted that the claimant said she "wasn't going to
put him as [her] beneficiary until we got married." See supra note 69. There seems to
have been no consideration given by the court to the possibility that one who had
decided not to get married and to reserve some legal autonomy might still meet the
Braschi standard, as evidenced by the other facts admittedly before the Court. These
facts include, among others, sharing household expenses and co-habitating for two
and a half years.
71. N.Y.L.J., December 1, 1993, p. 23 col. 1 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County).
72. Id. (emphasis added); see also Jorge v. Pacton, N.Y.L.J., January 5, 1994, p. 28
col. 4 (Yonkers City Ct. Westchester County) ("The parties in this case apparently had
a long relationship, residing in the subject apartment together, sleeping in the same
bed, splitting household expenses, [respondent] caring for the [decedent] in his last
illness. [h]owever, this evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the parties
had an 'in-depth commitment' ..... There was no evidence of joint bank accounts,
joint credit cards, joint property ownership, no formalization of legal obligations.").
The Eberhart court amazingly added: "[i]n addition, respondent failed to produce [his
former lover] as a witness on his behalf." N.Y.L.J., December 1, 1993, p. 23 col. 1.
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It has been suggested that the problems described above are in-
herent in the Braschi standard itself.73 However, based on the
analysis of Braschi and the regulations that codify Braschi set forth
in Part II, and based on the successes in the cases discussed in Part
III A, and further based on my own experiences litigating such
cases, I remain unconvinced of that position. It seems that the dis-
tortions described above arise when the courts confuse the stan-
dard to be applied with the suggested categories or types of
evidence by which one can demonstrate one's claim of meeting
such a standard.74  The standard, however articulated, centers
around the core values/functions of care and commitment. I have
demonstrated above in Part II that those core values/functions in-
formed the Braschi Court's articulation of the standard to be ap-
plied in adjudicating family succession claims: "the totality of the
relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacri-
fice of the parties. ' 75 Similarly, the factors suggested by the Bras-
chi Court focus on related core values: continuity/length, level of
emotional commitment, daily interaction, reliance. 6
The amended regulations also focus on the core values of "emo-
tional and financial commitment, and interdependence. '77 The fac-
tors to be considered, set forth in greater detail and specificity than
in Braschi, envision a wide variety of arrangements by which those
core values are self-defined and incarnated in particular relation-
ships.78 Indeed, the final factor listed in the regulations encourages
such an expansive reading: "any other pattern of behavior, agree-
The nuanced and fact sensitive approach of the court in Colon, supra note 54, is in
stark contrast to the myopic approach of the GSL Enterprises, Eberhart, and Jorge
courts.
73. See, e.g., Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 30, at 1653-57;
Note, Redefining Family, supra note 8, at 195-97.
74. See also, Allerton Assoc. v. Shannon, N.Y.L.J., February 26, 1993, p. 26 col. 6
(Civ. Ct. Bx. County) (heterosexual couple: although court held that relationship
commenced when couple began living together and that couple shared household ex-
penses and held themselves out as a couple, court gave determinative weight to fact
that relationship lasted only seven months); Fetner v. Fenner, N.Y.L.J., November 21,
1990, p. 22 col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (heterosexual life partners: although court
found that relationship had begun as a committed relationship, it placed primary em-
phasis on what it considered to be a relatively short duration [three years] punctuated
with frequent absences, ending with tenant's moving out, and no holding out or finan-
cial interdependence).
75. 543 N.E.2d at 55.
76. Id.
77. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(1990), § 2520.6(o)(2)(1990).
78. See supra note 38.
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ment, or other action which evidences the intention of creating a
long-term, emotionally committed relationship. 79
Thus, for a court to give dispositive emphasis to one factor or
category of evidence is a distortion of both Braschi and the regula-
tions which should be resisted both at the trial and appellate level.
The final and dispositive word in this regard is from the Braschi
Court: "These factors are most helpful, although it should be em-
phasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is
not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship ... which
should, in the final analysis, control."80
Another concern, which is admittedly inherent in the nature of
the Braschi standard, is the inevitable invasion of privacy involved
in demonstrating one's family claim at trial, especially in the dispir-
iting environs of New York City's Housing Court.81 In 1982, when
the facts of the family relationship were generally not challenged,82
one judge presciently noted:
Some day, sooner or later, a landlord opposing a [tenant's] mo-
tion to dismiss is going to allege that the parties (tenants) do not
maintain a "close and loving" relationship, but are merely
friends or roommates .... and "put the parties to their proof."
Here the distasteful problem arises - how do individuals prove
a "quasi-marital" relationship? How does a landlord disprove
it? The issue gives rise to difficulties of both an evidentiary and
a constitutional nature. This court suggests that the potential
problems might be solved by allowing the sworn statement of a
"quasi-marital" relationship, to give rise to an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that such a relationship does exist. An irrebuttable
presumption may be utilized where public policy demands that
certain lines of inquiry be avoided.83
Although the reasoning in Braschi and the terms of the amended
regulations articulate a public policy favoring a "line of inquiry"
79. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(h)(1990), § 2520.6(o)(2)(viii)(1990) (emphasis
added).
80. 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (emphasis added); see also 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)
(1990), § 2520.6(o)(2)(1990): "no single factor shall be solely determinative."
81. Although significant changes have been made in New York City's Housing
Court since 1987, it is unfortunately true that conditions are "still disgraceful and
totally inadequate" and that the manner in which litigation is conducted is all too
often best described as "an orchestrated zoo" or a "circus." AMERICAN CIVIL LIBER-
TIES UNION, JUSTICE EVICTED: AN INQUIRY INTO HOUSING COURT PROBLEMS
(1987).
82. See supra note 23.
83. Yorkshire House Assoc. v. Lulkin, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982)(emphasis in original).
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into a claimant's personal, emotional relationship with the tenant,
the "distasteful problem" identified by this jurist is still present.84
Minimally, the Disciplinary Rules and the Model Rules offer
some guidance in challenging the more "distasteful" aspects of this
process. Advocates must confront an adversary's deposing or
cross-examining a claimant "merely to harass or maliciously in-
jure, "85 or asking a question "that is intended to degrade a witness
or other person,"86 or "engag[ing] in . . .discourteous behavior
which is degrading to a tribunal. 87
Some have suggested that domestic partner registration may be a
way of avoiding the invasion of privacy and potential bias and dis-
tortion that arise when lesbian and gay relationships are adjudi-
cated using a functional definition.88 I support any strategy for
achieving recognition of gay relationships, including domestic part-
ner registries. However, in their present form, domestic partner
registries do not avoid the problems raised by use of a functional
definition of "family" discussed above. First, unless expanded sig-
nificantly beyond their current incarnations, such registries only in-
clude one form of family relationship, i.e., one modelled on a
husband-wife configuration.89 Second, most domestic partner re-
gistries do not automatically bring with them many significant ben-
efits, such as family anti-eviction protection. For example, under
the current scheme in New York, registration is merely some evi-
dence of a family-type relationship, not an irrebuttable presump-
tion.90 It has been suggested that registration be made a rebuttable
presumption of a family relationship. 9' However, the family mem-
84. See, e.g., Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 30, at 1653-57;
Note, Redefining Family, supra note 8, at 195-97. On the more general issue of the
privacy rights of lesbians and gays, see VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1991).
85. DR 7-102(A)(1).
86. DR 7-105(c)(2).
87. DR 7-105(c)(5). See also Model Rule 4.4 ("shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person").
88. See, e.g., Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 30, at 1657-59;
Note, Redefining the Family, supra note 8, at 196-97.
89. It is beyond the scope of this article to address the implications of such a
choice. See, e.g.. Weston, supra note 30, at 205-210; Heidi Sorenson, A New Gay
Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimina-
tion, 81 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2128-30 (1993). An unintended by-product of such a choice
could be an image of lesbian and gay society as composed exclusively of couples,
"bachelor gentlemen," "old maids" and "widows/widowers." Lesbian and gay family
configurations are demonstrably more varied and rich than that. See Weston, supra
note 30.
90. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(e)(1990), § 2520.6(o)(2)(v)(1990).
91. See Note, Much Ado About Nothing?, supra note 8, at 385-86.
PUSHING THE LAW
ber would inevitably be compelled to demonstrate the validity of
the registration by evidence similar to that now required under
Braschi.92 Further, if we choose to emphasize domestic partner re-
gistration as an available and effective means of validating our rela-
tionships, courts may give dispositive weight to the absence of such
registration in rejecting family claims.93 Thus, those who do not,
cannot or choose not to register may find their families devalued.94
Indeed, it has been suggested that reliance on such mechanisms
as domestic partnership registrations and same sex marriage 95 by
which to achieve recognition for lesbian and gay families would not
only force conformance to heterosexual models, but also would
marginalize lesbian and gay relationships as a separate, but une-
qual form of quasi-marriage. 96 As I said earlier, although I support
all strategies for achieving recognition for lesbian/gay relationships,
it may be that by creating an expansive, functional understanding
of "family" and other such relational terms, by which statutes, reg-
92. The suggestion that such scrutiny could take place in an administrative hear-
ing, rather than in Court, would change nothing. See Note, Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, supra note 8, at 385-86. It has been my experience, confirmed in conversations
with attorneys from the Gay Men's Health Crisis, the Legal Aid Society and Legal
Services who have litigated such claims before D.H.C.R. and H.P.D., that the same
invasive inquiry into the nature of the relationship occurs at administrative hearings.
93. See, e.g., Eberhart v. Randall, N.Y.L.J., December 1, 1993, p. 23 col. 1 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County) ("There is no evidence of such critical considerations [indicating a com-
mitted relationship] as... [a] domestic partnership declaration.") (emphasis added)).
94. Such a result would be a strange irony. Our journey from "the term family...
be[ing] rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by
obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order" would have
brought us full circle back to a notion of family based on "fictitious legal distinctions."
Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53.
95. A discussion of the debate regarding gay/lesbian marriage within the lesbian
and gay community is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 397-406; for a more general historical investigation of same-sex marriages,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419
(1993); and JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE, 28-107, 199-
279 (1994).
96. See Sorenson, supra note 89. An alternative proposal is to cease using mar-
riage as a status by which benefits are conferred. See Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopt-
ing a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91 (1990/91). Others
have suggested abandoning the use of even the broader category of "family" to de-
fine/describe gay, lesbian or straight relationships and to confer benefits. See, e.g.,
Freeman, supra note 30, at 67-9; Robson, supra note 30, at 991-93; for a more nuanced
discussion of the tension and dialectic involved in a lesbian or gay appropriation of
the term "family," see Brenda Cossman, Family Inside/Out, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 1
(Winter 1994). However, it is unlikely and, perhaps, undesirable that society, includ-
ing lesbian and gay society, would cease giving particular value and concomitant ben-
efits to such relationships of care and commitment that effect and benefit society. See,
e.g., Minow, supra note 37, at 276-84; Weston, supra note 30, at 103-136, 202-205;
Herman, supra note 30, at 800-801.
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ulations and case law are interpreted to include the various forms
of caring and commitment chosen by lesbian, gay and straight per-
sons, gay relationships are placed at the center of the legal land-
scape without losing their own uniqueness.97 The significant
advancement in the recognition of lesbian and gay relationships
achieved in Braschi followed just such a model: a coalition of les-
bian, gay, tenant, disabled, elderly and poor advocates collaborat-
ing first in the Braschi litigation, then in assisting the New York
State Division of Housing and Community Renewal in drafting its
amended family anti-eviction regulations, and finally in defending
those regulations in the Rent Stabilization Association v. Higgins
litigation.98 To the extent that that model of legislative/regulatory
97. See Sorenson, supra note 89 for a discussion of "dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion"; see also Chief Justice Kaye's discussion of the process whereby courts "look...
to modern-day realities in giving definition to statutory concepts." Matter of Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 591-92 (1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
98. I do not idealize this success. I am fully aware that full equality was not
achieved. Families defined by biology and legally-recognized bonds still do not need
to present anything more than a certification of that fact in order to avoid eviction
from their homes. They need not prove any emotional or financial commitment or
interdependence. Indeed, any scrutiny into such aspects of their relationship is pro-
hibited. Z.H. Control Co. v. Sullivan, N.Y.L.J., September 8, 1993, p. 21 col. 2 (N.Y.
App. Term); Gottlieb v. Martha A. & George B., N.Y.L.J., December 4, 1992, p. 22
col. 5 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County). In addition, I am aware that some courts have been
hesitant to adopt a functional interpretation of relational terms which, from their cul-
tural or legislative histories, appear to be limited to biological-, gender-, or marital-
based relationships. See, e.g., Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y.
1991) ("parent" for visitation purposes limited to "biological parent"), but see the
persuasive dissent of now Chief Justice Kaye arguing for a functional interpretation
guided by the petitioner's actual relationship to the child and the best interests of the
child, id. at 30-33; Matter of Christine, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1994, p. 30 col. 5 (Sur. Ct.
Kings County) (lesbian partner's adoption petition denied on theory that adoption
statute requires termination of biological mother's parental rights unless proposed
adoptive parent is mother's legally-recognized heterosexual "spouse"), but see In re
Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1992) (lesbian two-parent
adoption permitted where the adoptive and biological parents function as co-parents
of the child and, thus, denial of adoption would be irrational and contrary to the best
interests of the child), Adoption of B.L.V.D. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. Sup. Ct.
1993) (same); In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984) (gay lover's attempt to
adopt partner denied since relationship is not one of "parent/child"), but see dissent,
id. at 427-29 (uncoerced desire of two adults to take on the legal status of parent/child,
which is not otherwise contrary to public policy, should be permitted), see also 333 E.
53 St. Assoc. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (same) aff'd 512
N.E.2d 541, In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1993) (agreeing
with and citing the dissent in Robert Paul P.), cf. Boswell, supra note 95, at 97-107,
221-29 (historical investigation of the use of collateral adoption to provide formal
recognition of same-sex unions); Matter of Cooper, 594 N.Y.S. 2d 797 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (gay lover is not "spouse" for elective share purposes); Kahn v. Pizarro,
N.Y.L.J., September 1, 1993, p. 23 col 1. (Civ. Ct. Bronx County) ("spouse" as used in
New York's Rent Stabilization Code § 2524.4(a)(2), which protects elderly or disabled
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and common law reform was successful, it provides some guidance
in other attempts to gain recognition for lesbian and gay families.
IV. Conclusion
The functional definition of "family" adopted in Braschi and
codified in New York's family anti-eviction regulations has demon-
strated itself to be a significant, although imperfect, means by
which to effect recognition and protection for lesbian and gay fami-
lies. When used in the holistic, flexible, and inclusive manner in-
tended by the Braschi Court and D.H.C.R., the courts have been
pushed to recognize the varied ways in which lesbians and gay men
care for and commit to one another. Where courts have under-
stood these core values/functions in a mechanistic or rigid manner,
they have negated the reality of lesbian and gay families by judging
them in relation to idealized, patriarchal, and formal models of the
ways in which families self-define and structure their relationships.
Nevertheless, the fact that over one million households in New
York State are now governed by a standard which has the potential
of protecting lesbian and gay families from eviction from their
homes is a major advance in the ongoing struggle to "push the law
to encompass the reality of our families."
tenants or their "spouses" from eviction under certain circumstances, includes only
legally-recognized heterosexual "spouse" absent statutory or regulatory amendment);
for a more general discussion of cases evidencing this tension, see RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 443-74, 532-37.
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